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HusBAND AND WIFE-PERSONAL ToRT AcnoNs BE'IWEEN SPousEs-
STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION-Following an interlocutory divorce decree, and 
while the parties were living apart from one another, defendant allegedly as-
saulted the plaintiff. The trial court dismissed her complaint on the ground 
that no action could be brought by one spouse against the other for personal 
torts committed during coverture. On appeal, held, reversed, three judges dis-
senting and one concurring. The Judicial Code and the Husband and Wife 
Statutes of Utah,1 when considered together, entitle a married woman to main-
tain an action against her husband for injuries intentionally inflicted upon 
her. Taylor -v. Patten, 2 Utah (2d) 404, 275 P. (2d) 696 (1954). 
It is a familiar principle of the common law that one spouse is not liable 
to the other in tort. Some of the early cases cited as a basis for this principle 
the doctrine that husband and wife were one person,2 but most of the later 
cases also justify the rule as being necessary to the preservation of domestic 
tranquility.3 With the advent of the Married Women's Property Acts, designed 
1 Utah Code Ann. (1953) §§78-11-1, 30-2-1 et seq. 
2 See, e.g., Phillips v. Barnet, Q.B.D. 436 (1876). The origin of the unity doctrine 
is described in BRYCE, STUDIES IN HisTORY AND JumsPRODBNCE, 2d ed., 819 (1901). 
3 Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877); Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. '611, 31 
S.Ct. 111 (1910). In Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N.C. 566, 118 S.E. 9 (1923), the court 
noted a further argument in favor of the immunity: the desirability of avoiding the "un-
seemly spectacle of transmuting family bickering into court actions." An applicable statute, 
however, had abrogated the former law. See PROSSER, TORTS 898 (1941). 
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to emancipate married women from many of the disabilities imposed upon 
them by the common law, great inroads were made on both the unity concept 
and the resulting interspousal immunity. Dozens of cases have involved the 
application of these statutes to the issue presented in the principal case, and 
dozens more have involved negligence actions between spouses.4 With only 
seven states unreported on these issues," the returns show that the common law 
is still a persistent vote getter; it has lost support in only fifteen states.6 Here 
and there it has received the support of express statutory provisions,7 but its 
principal strength is to be found in judicial construction of statutes which vary 
greatly in language from state to state. 
In only three states have express statutory provisions settled the question 
in favor of allowing such suits.8 Elsewhere the same result has been achieved 
by one or more of at least four judicial methods. In several states it has been 
reached by liberal interpretation of certain general provisions giving married 
women access to the courts, and causes of action, for the enforcement of various 
personal and property rights.9 As in the case of statutes under which a contrary 
result has been reached, these statutes are by no means uniform in language.10 
In the principal case the court employed this method without conspicuous suc-
cess. The extent to which statutory language11 was stretched, and the court's 
disregard of several cardinal rules of construction, is well pointed out by the 
dissenters. The court rescued itself, however, by calling upon a second judicial 
method for reversing the common law rule. This method calls for an exami-
4 Cases -of both kinds are collected in 160 A.L.R. 1406 (1946) and earlier annotations 
there referred to. See also 2 A.L.R. Supp. Dec. 739 (1952) and 1955 A.L.R. Supp. Dec. 
351. 
5 Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, and South Dakota. The 
Wisconsin court has already had occasion to interpret the Arizona statute [Ariz. Code Ann. 
(1939) §§63-302, 63-303] and has concluded that the immunity is abolished in that state 
also. Jaeger v. Jaeger, 262 Wis. 14, 53 N.W. (2d) 740 (1952). The Arizona cases cited 
by the court involved torts against the property, rather than the person, of the spouse. 
6 Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, New Hampshire, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Wisconsin, 
and Utah. Cases and statutes are cited below. 
1 m. Rev. Stat. (1952) c. 68, §1, amended shortly after the lliinois Supreme Court 
adopted the nrinority view in Brandt v. Keller, 413 ill. 503, 109 N.E. (2d) 729 (1952). 
See Mass. Gen. Laws (Ter. ed., 1932) c. 209, §6, for a provision bordering on a prohibi-
tion of such actions. 
s 14 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1941) §57; N.C. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1953) 
§52-10.1; Wis. Stat. (1953) §246.075 (confers upon husbands a right of action in tort 
against their wives, §246.07 having been construed in Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209-
N.W. 475 (1926), to create a similar right in married women). 
9 Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P. (2d) 740 (1935); Brown v. Gosser, note 8 supra, 
Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 A. 657 (1915); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 
191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E. 787 (1920); Wait 
v. Pierce, note 8 supra. 
10 Compare the statutory provisions relied upon in the cases cited in note 9 supra. 
These statutes are currently Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 90, art. 2-2; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) 
§404.060; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 340, §1; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §14-0705; S.C. 
Code (1952) §10-216; Wis. Stat. (1953) §246.07. 
11 The specific language relied upon by the court appears in Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
§§30-2-2 and 30-2-4. 
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nation of the statute as a whole; if the substance of the unity doctrine has been 
undercut by conferring upon married women full rights to hold property in 
their own names, free from their husbands' control and not subject to his debts 
and liabilities, and if at the same time access to the courts has been given for 
the preservation of these rights, then the unity doctrine itself has ceased to 
exist.12 The court simply concludes that the immunity role, as the offspring of 
the unity doctrine, has perished with its parent. 
The concurring opinion invokes a third approach to the issue. It embodies 
the view that the common law rule had more than one parent; in addition to 
the unity doctrine, concededly abolished by the statute, there is also the matter 
of domestic tranquility to contend with. The statute having been silent on 
this matter, it is felt that the court is free to decide whether any vitality remains 
in the public policy basis of the immunity rule. Moreover, the danger of 
collusive suits designed to defraud insurance companies is deemed significant. 
The concurring judge sees danger of both marital disharmony and collusion, and 
would therefore limit the remedial effect of the statutes to cases in which the 
parties have obtained at least an interlocutory divorce decree.13 The weak-
nesses of the argument that family harmony is jeopardized by the liberal rule 
have often been pointed out14 and need not be repeated here. There is also 
rebuttal to the argument that collusive suits will result: (1) the insurance com-
panies may exempt themselves from such liability by contract; (2) if necessary, 
a statute might be enacted to provide a similar exemption, at least where the 
policy does not expressly provide for such coverage;15 and (3) experience in 
states which have long allowed these suits has not demonstrated the validity of 
the collusion argument.16 
The fourth approach is illustrated in the dissenting opinion, where it is 
implied that policy considerations are inseparable from the unity doctrine in 
the process of determining whether the immunity rule continues in effect. 
Thus, a statute does not abrogate the common law unless it serves the dual 
12 Some of the cases in which this reasoning has been invoked, and current statutes 
which have been so construed, are Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 S. 335 (1917) 
[Ala. Code (1940) tit. 34, §65 et seq.]; Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 43, 89 A. 889 (1914) 
[Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §7307]; Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P. (2d) 733 (1949) 
[Idaho Code (1948) §32-901 et seq.]; Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, 158 Ohio St. 107, 
107 N.E. (2d) 337 (1952) [Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §§3103.03 to 3103.08]. 
13 See 48 CoL. L. REv. 961 (1948), where it is argued that such actions between 
former spouses should no longer be denied. 
14 See, e.g., Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P. (2d) 660 (1938); PROSSER, 
TORTS 898 et seq. (1941); Morris, "What Price Marriage," 1946 lNs. L.J. 911 at 942. 
15 A statute of this type has been enacted in New York. 27 N.Y. Consol. Laws 
(McKinney, 1949) §167(3). 
16 Interspousal tort actions have been permitted in some states for more than forty 
years, yet Illinois is the only state in which legislation has resulted in a return to the 
common law rule. It may also be doubted that experience led to the reversal in Illinois, 
since the statute was amended very shortly after the minority view had been adopted by 
the courts of that state. See note 7 supra. 
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purpose of abolishing the unity doctrine and adopting a new public policy.17 
The opinion of the court anticipates this approach and rebuts it by concluding 
that the very abolition of the unity doctrine reflects the adoption of a new policy 
by the legislature. This anticipatory rebuttal is not a worthy effort, however, 
as the dissenters generously point out 
The principal case offers little that will be of additional aid to courts and 
practitioners who will deal with the issue in the future. Yet the combination 
of divergent approaches to the subject, and the consequent variations in result, 
make the case not only a starting point for analysis but an ideal pedagogical tool 
for the teacher of legislation or domestic relations. 
Robert B. Olsen, S.Ed. 
17 Compare Wait v. Pierce, note 8 supra. On the application of public policy to 
statutory construction, see generally SUTHERLAND, STATOTORY CoNsTRuCTioN, 3d ed., 
§§5901 to 5905 (1943). 
